Ahmed Rashid


Reveals Pakistan's


Many Challenges


Ahmed Rashid

Award-winning Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid discusses the crisis in Pakistan, the futility of extending NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, and the impact that the region may endure in the wake of any military action against Iran.

04.08.12

Overview

Few persons can be called “indispensible,” but Ahmed Rashid is one of them. Rashid, who spoke to The Chicago Council’s recent conference on “Smart Defense and the Future of NATO,” is a journalist reporting and writing from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Widely recognized as the leading authority on this region, Rashid gained fame when his book, Taliban, became a must-read after the 9/11 attacks. A native of Pakistan based in Lahore, he writes for the Financial Times, the International Herald Tribune, New York Review of books, BBC Online, and other publications around the world. He has written four books, including his latest, Pakistan on the Brink, which describes the meltdown of his home country and the potential chaos it faces after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

After his presentation, Rashid talked with me about a wide range of Middle Eastern issues, the crisis in Pakistan, how skillful diplomacy might restore at least a few shreds of the tattered U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the futility of extending NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, and perhaps most seriously, the impact that the region may endure in the wake of any military action against Iran.

Q:

Richard Longworth

I wanted to ask you about Pakistan but something came up in the conference that I wanted to ask about first. This business of “caveats”—I don’t think this is a familiar term to the American public. But they seem to be very important and have had quite a negative effect in Afghanistan. Could you just explain to me what you mean by “caveats” and the impact they’ve had?

A:

Caveats are the restrictions that countries and governments place on their troops when they deploy them to Afghanistan. So for example, some countries don’t allow their troops to go on the offensive. Other countries refuse to let Afghans or soldiers from other countries travel in their helicopters. So there are all sorts of restrictions, and these are called caveats. And at the height of the NATO deployment there were about eighty caveats which restricted the commander in chief to be able to deploy all of NATO’s troops against a particular Taliban attack.

It was crippling. Devastating, even. And it was extremely demoralizing for the Afghans, because they saw these heavily armed troops never leaving their camp, never going on the offensive, being attacked by the Taliban but not retaliating. They couldn’t understand it. And the Americans and NATO couldn’t explain it.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Most of what most of us know about what goes on out there we’ve learned from you and your books, especially Taliban. You’ve got a new book now out, Pakistan on the Brink, which seems to consider the U.S. mission in Afghanistan pretty much a lost cause and focuses on the regional impact, especially on Pakistan. Can you say what will be the impact on Pakistan of the impending U.S. pullout in Afghanistan, leaving behind what’s probably going to be a political and security vacuum?

A:

First of all, Pakistan is facing a huge internal crisis which has nothing to do with Afghanistan but everything to do with its own failure after the end of the Cold War to wake up to the new reality that was taking place in the ’90s. Pakistan continued to pursue wars in Kashmir, Indian Kashmir. It continued to support the Taliban war in Afghanistan. And it completely missed out on all the benefits of the post-Cold War era. As a result, we have chronic economic stagnation, a huge energy crisis, no infrastructure, social unrest, and insurgencies in two of the four provinces.

Now clearly this crisis would benefit a lot if there was a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan between the Taliban, Karzai government, and the Americans, so that Afghanistan by 2014 could be at relative peace. That would have a major impact on the Pakistani Taliban; that is, those extremists who are fighting the government and the army in Pakistan itself. But if there is no settlement in Afghanistan, I think the situation in Pakistan will deteriorate very rapidly.

 

Q:

Richard Longworth

Will Afghanistan just become a Taliban and Pakistan playground?

A:

Well, the border region, most of which is in Pakistan, would become a playground not just for the Taliban but for numerous other groups who are active in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, and possibly even who could revive al-Qaeda itself. Even though al-Qaeda has been decimated, recent events should give us pause, namely, this massacre in France. This gentleman trained in Pakistan with the Pakistani Taliban, but he claimed they were also al-Qaeda, when in fact they were Pakistani Taliban. But there is a real threat of the Pakistani Taliban setting themselves up as global jihadists in place of al-Qaeda, which would be extremely dangerous.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Now talks between the United States and the Taliban I believe have begun in the Gulf, right? How much can we expect from these discussions?

A:

The talks have been ongoing for nearly a year. It has been very slow-moving at present. Part of the problem has been the divisions within the Obama administration, with some sections of the administration not in favor of the talks. A significant number of confidence-building measures need to be established between the Americans and the Taliban. We still haven’t got over the hurdle number one, which is an exchange of prisoners: five Taliban in exchange for one American soldier.

If we could get over this, you know, we could quickly develop more confidence-building measures on the military side to reduce the conflict both by the Americans and by the Taliban—perhaps province by province, month by month—and slowly build up trust so that political negotiations could then start with the Karzai government on a power-sharing deal.

Q:

Richard Longworth

But why should the Taliban take this seriously? All they have to do really is just wait us out.

A:

I don’t think the Taliban want to go into another civil war. And it would be a civil war because waiting this out means, what—they take the south, they take the east? They would not be able to take the north. They might not even be able to take Kabul. And that would just lead to an even more bloody civil war. The Taliban, don’t forget, have lost thousands of their fighters and men. I think they want an end to the war just as much as anybody else does.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Now, as you’ve written, Pakistan right now is a wildly anti-American country. There are virtually no relations between our two militaries. It’s really tempting to write off Pakistan as a failed state beyond any influence we might wield. But is this realistic? And more to the point, is it responsible? Is there still some way to rebuild relations and exert some sort of a positive influence there?

A:

I think relations will be rebuilt slowly, but they will be of a much more limited kind than we had before. You won’t have a thousand CIA agents running around Pakistan as you did before. You will have very limited intelligence cooperation. I hope the road which takes U.S. and NATO goods from the Karachi port to the bases in Afghanistan reopens. I have other hopes, too, but there are going to be huge differences that persist no matter what. For example, on the drones: Pakistan will reject use of drones by the Americans. The Americans will insist that drones continue to be used inside Pakistan.

Q:

Richard Longworth

A nuclear Pakistan is already a very scary place. Does this mean we would really probably have no influence over this at all?

A:

No. I mean, I don’t know what the nuclear deal is. But we know certainly that after 9/11, President Bush gave at least $100 million to Pakistan to secure its nuclear facilities. Now the nuclear weapons come under the military. The military is still very much disciplined, hierarchical, in charge, in control. There have been no major leaks of any kind in the last 11 years. I hope that it stays solid. I think the Americans have a very good handle on exactly what is the state of the nuclear weapons. Obviously they’re not telling, and it would be embarrassing to Pakistan if they did tell.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Some of the U.S. military and politicians like Senator McCain insist that we could still win in Afghanistan if we just stayed the course. What’s your opinion?

A:

There can be no military victory in Afghanistan. Ten years of war makes this the longest war America has ever fought. It’s longer than the First and Second World Wars put together. And there’s been no military victory at the end of this, with 150,000 troops and billions and billions of dollars. How long is this going to last? The problem is that the real things that the Americans should have done by now, such as building a sustainable economy, building a sustainable justice system, training sufficient number of Afghans to administer their country have not been done. And that’s what I fear may lead to a breakdown once the American forces leave.

Q:

Richard Longworth

With two years to go, it’s a little late, don’t you think?

A:

You can’t do everything, but I still think there’s time for improvement.

Q:

Richard Longworth

The Soviets withdrew in 1989, leaving a vacuum behind. Is history just repeating itself?

A:

Well, remember, the Soviets were desperate for a deal between the Afghan communists and the mujahideen, the Afghan holy warriors. And the CIA refused to allow that deal because the CIA wanted revenge for Vietnam, and they wanted the Afghan communists to collapse. In fact, the Afghan communists held on for three years. So I hope that you will put all your heart into looking for a deal with the Taliban; you will not try and block this in any way. Hopefully by 2014 when you do leave, you do not leave in a state of war, but you leave in a state of semi-peace at least.

Q:

Richard Longworth

But even after we leave, Afghanistan is going to need a tremendous amount of help, especially financial help. What financial commitment is needed from the United States and the allies to give Afghanistan the funds that it needs to rebuild itself?

A:

Well, unfortunately I’m very pessimistic on that. Given the recession in Europe and the struggle in the United States to improve the economy, I think it’ll be very difficult to get Congress here and parliaments in Europe to approve large funding for Afghanistan. But nevertheless, I hope sufficient money will be there to at least fund the security forces for the next four to five years, because that money is really going to be needed.

As far as developing infrastructure, the economy, I fear that money probably is not going to be available to the Afghans. I hope for things like education, which has made such enormous strides in the last ten years, and also for health care, that there will be sufficient funds.

 

Q:

Richard Longworth

Let’s shift focus a bit, but not entirely. On Iran, most of the attention here concerning any possible military action against Iran focuses on Iran and Israel. But what’ll be the broader regional impact on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia? And do you think anybody in Washington or Tel Aviv is thinking about this?

A:

I think what the American media is not portraying is the chaos that will ensue in the region, stretching from Lebanon across the Middle East to the Gulf Arab states to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India if Iran is attacked. I think Iran is preparing for guerilla action all across this belt, because it has groups in each country who would act on its behalf, taking guerilla action against the Americans.

I think there would be a huge upsurge of Shias who are a former minority in all these countries, and a very vocal and activist minority, rising in support of Iran. I also think there would be very large-scale Sunni unrest against the Americans. And we could be looking at anti-Americanism, and obviously anti-Israeli feelings also, spreading all across the Middle East into South Asia, because many Muslims would see solely as the third country America has bombed in ten years. Which it would be, and I think there would be enormous anger at this.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Presumably whatever progress we’ve achieved in Iraq would be simply swallowed up in this.

A:

Yes. Iraq would be able to hold its own. It’s got oil; it’s not a economic basket case. It also has a lot of neighbors with whom it has to have good relations. But whether Iraq would remain a democracy in any sense of the word, that, I agree is questionable.

Q:

Richard Longworth

Finally, a question on the former Central Asia republics, the so-called “stans.” We’ve been a presence on Russia’s southern border there for more than a decade now. Pretty soon we will be reducing our presence there and eliminating it altogether. How do you see the Russians’ reaction to what must look like them to be something of an opportunity?

A:

Without a doubt, it will be an opportunity for them. I think the Russians want the Americans out of Central Asia as fast as possible. And they want to restore their own bases. But Russia is also having very acute economic problems and political problems. And it’s not popular inside Russia itself to be talking about re-establishing the old Soviet empire.

So this is perhaps similar to the problems the Americans are facing right now. The Americans are anti-intervention anywhere around the world. And the Russian people, who are economically hard up and suffering because of the recession, et cetera, are also against intervention or re-establishing their empire. I fear that these Central Asian states will see enormous unrest, because they’re experiencing poverty, lack of governance, and no reform agenda; and the leadership is basically old and Soviet-trained. It’s not a modern leadership.